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question of teaching method. To review a casebook without knowledge
of the direction of classroom discussion and supplementation is akin to
describing a human being from a view of his skeleton.
In this instance the skeleton is admirably constructed. The cases do
illustrate the material within the outline of the work. As illustrations of
his pointt Mr. McCurdy has chosen, where possible, cases which are factu-
ally as well as legally interesting. That the cases are long is caused by
the nature of the subject: the more closely is a case related to human
factors, the more carefully balanced must be the social evidence and the
more inclusive the picture of the entire situation. Most important of the
book's virtues is its absence of partnership. Casebooks as well as texts
can be so constructed as to attempt the proof of the editor's theories. In
the field of the domestic relations theories are as diverse as the emotions.
In leaving sociological theories entirely to classroom discussion, Mr. Mc-
Curdy has made his book the more universally of service.
In the practice of the law in this country the domestic relations have
largely been looked at askance by the bar. That the subjects are of vast
consequence is obvious. That there is a need of instruction in their legal
elements, and a need to inculcate a social point of view, can be seen from
&he unfortunate diversity in our statute and case law. Toward this end
Professor McCurdy's volume, with its avowed purpose of modernizing the
subjects of domestic relations and its consequent popularizing of them in the
law schools, is a distinct step in advance in its potential influence on the
law of the coming generation. GEOFFREY MAY.
Les Gouvernements de fait devant le juge. By Noel-Henry. Preface by
Prof. J. Basdevant. Paris, Libraire R. Guillon, 1927. pp. xxxii, 260.
This is an interesting study of an increasingly important problem of
constitutional and international law. The de facto Government, the un-
recognized administrator of a particular area, local or national, enters into
factual and legal relations with citizens and aliens, resident in the territory
controlled, and to some extent with foreign governments. The effect that
is to be given to such acts of de facto Governments (a) by the courts of
the parent State or de jure Government, (b) by the courts of third States
which have not recognized the de facto Government, and (c) by inter-
national courts, is the special problem with which the author is concerned.
He has drawn, as sources, upon the decisions of municipal courts in France,
Germany, Italy, England and the United States and upon certain decisions
of international tribunals.
In his approach to the problem from the three distinct points of view
mentioned, the author has thrown light upon it. Briefly, his thesis is that
the term de facto Government is one of constitutional, not international
law. Before (a) domestic judges, who are bound by the views of the
political department, the matter presents a simple constitutional question.
Before (b) judges of third states, the issue turns on the recognition or
refusal thereof by the political department, the courts deducing the neces-
sary legal consequences. The author criticizes some of the recent decisions
of the New York Court of Appeals in dealing with the acts of the $Soviet
Government and challenges the views of certain authors by asserting that
precedents from group (a) are drawn upon for the solution of problems
in group (b) and by characterizing as improper the independent investiga-
tion by the courts of political facts and the drawing of conclusions there-
from. Possibly the peculiar anomaly presented by the relations of the
United States to Soviet Russia, the impossibility of disregarding obvious
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facts and the desire to do justice in particular cases account for some
of the decisions of our courts, even if they depart from scientific theory.
Besides, it is doubtful if the author's postulated thesis is as general or
politic as he assumes. Before (c) the international judge, the author
maintains, the problem is not one of governments de facto, but of the
recognition of insurrectionary governments, and the extent to which
they may validly bind the State. These matters are, he says, to be judged
by international law exclusively; so that he imposes on the international
judge the duty and function of determining whether recognition was
properly granted or withheld, and thence deduces legal consequences. Thus,
he concludes that Judge Taft, as Sole Arbitrator of the claim of Great
Britain against Costa Rica arising out of the acts of the unrecognized
Tinoco government, should have dismissed the British claim because Britain
had failed to perform its "international duty" to recognize the Tinoco
government. (1924) 18 Am. J. OF INTEir. LAW 155. Presumably, he would
also, on the same ground, consider the United States estopped from press-
ing claims against Mexico arising out of acts of the Huerta government.
But the Mixed Claims Commission dicl not so decide and was probably
correct. Hopkins v. Mexico, Opinions of the Commissioners 42, 50 (Mixed
Claims Comm., 1927). The author's view is interesting and not without
merit de lege ferenda, but it can hardly be deemed an existing rule of
international law. Recognition is still a national political act, not yet
subject to criteria set by international law. Incidentally, it may be said
that the work of Spiropoulos, Die de facto.regjicmng im T1:9crr'cht (1920)
has dealt more thoroughly with the international law aspects of the problem.
EDV-Nx BOrcIArm.
Tlhe Social Sciences and Their Intcrrclations. Edited by William F. Ogburn
and Alexander Goldenweiser. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927. pp.
viii, 506.
The editors in a rapid survey in the introduction show the "one becoming
many" as points of view develop into science- The efficacy of these points
of view in bringing new hypotheses to light obscures the fact that the
separate techniques are fundamentally different ways of attacking the
same problems. The separation becomes the more pronounced because
each discipline requires a life time to master, and because one inevitably
leans toward what one has worked long and hard to acquire, and what
one has found to be useful. It becomes complete when complicated technical
vocabularies make communication all but impossible. The aim of the pres-
ent volume is to make a new "one" by coordinating the many sciences, so
that each will cast its own particular illumination on every problem.
The essays that make up the body of the book are restatements of the
general aim with regard to specific sciences The importance of combining,
for instance, economic and anthropological methodology in studies of primi-
tive societies; of anthropology and law in studying modern society; of
psychology and political science; sociology and law; history and economics
etc., through the whole series of permutations and combinations of the
various social sciences. The need which the editors point out is empha-
sized by the succeeding papers; the thesis is strengthened but not clarified
by the cumulative evidence presented. Only occasionally, as in Allport's
article on Political Science and Psychology (p. 259) is there any indication
of the development of a new method.
Omniscience being rare, the problems of social science will not be solved
by single persons who are necessarily expert in only one field of learning,
aud who must therefore depend upon hearsay when they stray outside
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